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1. Abstract 
 
Public transportation is an important part of the U.S. transportation system.  After losing 
popularity in the U.S. during the mid-20th century, public transportation has been making a 
strong comeback in major metropolitan areas since the 1990s.  In an effort to reduce inner-city 
traffic congestion, promote environmentally sustainable development patterns, rejuvenate 
decaying central business districts, and take advantage of all the other externalities of public 
transportation (i.e., reduced air pollution, a smaller urban footprint reducing sprawl, etc.), urban 
areas have been actively expanding their existing systems or building completely new systems.  
Despite the strong interest in reinvesting in public transportation and a growth in ridership in real 
terms, transit agencies in the U.S. have traditionally been plagued with low ridership relative to 
other travel modes, and limited budgets, and often have operating deficits on an annual basis.  
Governments at all levels, while supportive of expanding transit systems and willing to bear the 
operating deficits, become fiscally strained during times of economic slowdown and have had to 
shuffle transit investments with other public priorities.  This can delay and indefinitely stop 
transit investments for years, costing the public the benefits of public transportation. 
 
A look into East Asian cities, namely Tokyo, Japan, and Hong Kong reveals a different approach 
in funding public transportation.  The model used in the two cities has been in use for decades 
and has resulted in public transportation systems that are extensive and well-utilized.  The model, 
called R + P, involves transit operators acting as both the infrastructure operator and station area 
designer, developer, and manager.  The R + P model is institutionally different from that of the 
U.S., and may hold lessons for U.S. policymakers when determining future financing 
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arrangements for public transportation.  R + P may aid in the eventual goal of establishing 
extensive and heavily used transit systems in major U.S. metropolitan areas, and improve the 
quality of life for the general public. 
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2. Background 
 
2.1. The Competitiveness of Transit 
 
For the last half of the 20th Century, U.S. has dedicated a substantial portion of its transportation 
resources to the motor vehicle travel.  While a great amount of resources have been committed to 
other modes of transportation, such as intra-regional transit and airline travel, as shown in Figure 
1, the number of passenger-miles traveled on each mode, shown in Table 1, demonstrates the 
skew in utility that motor vehicle travel enjoys over other modes (Bureau of Transportation 
Statistics [BTS], 2012; BTS, 2014).  At its peak in 2008, highways expenditures were 3.59, 4.33, 
16.28, and 141.30 times higher than expenditures in transit, air, water, and rail, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Transportation expenditures of all levels of government by mode.  (BTS, 2012).  
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Mode Millions of Passenger-Miles Travelled in 2012 Percentage 
Highway 4,274,877 86.93% 
Air 580,501 11.81% 
Transit 55,169 1.12% 
Rail 6,804 0.14% 
Total 4,917,352 100.00% 
Table 1.  U.S. Passenger-Miles by mode (Bureau of Transportation Statistics [BTS], 2014). 
 
In 2012, highways dominated the transportation market with over 4.27 trillion passenger-miles 
and 86.39 percent of the total miles traveled.  Air travel made up the second largest portion of all 
passenger travel, with over 580 billion passenger-miles travelled or 11.81 percent of the total.  
Transit and rail, on the other hand, were relatively used much less.  Just over 55 billion and 6.8 
billion passenger-miles were travelled by transit and rail, respectively.  Transit and rail 
collectively made up only 1.26 percent of all passenger-miles travelled.  It should be noted, 
however, that because transit trips are largely characterized by intra-regional and intra-city trips, 
the average distance travelled by each passenger will be relatively less than that of highway and 
air users.  Hence, the aggregate distance of transit users will be less.  Figure 2 displays the 
number of unlinked transit trips over time. 
 
 
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
1
8
9
0
1
9
1
2
1
9
1
9
1
9
2
2
1
9
2
5
1
9
2
8
1
9
3
1
1
9
3
4
1
9
3
7
1
9
4
0
1
9
4
3
1
9
4
6
1
9
4
9
1
9
5
2
1
9
5
5
1
9
5
8
1
9
6
1
1
9
6
4
1
9
6
7
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
3
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
7
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
2
M
ill
io
n
s 
o
f 
U
n
lin
ke
d
 P
as
se
n
ge
r 
Tr
ip
s
Year
Alternative Institutional Arrangements for Urban Transit and Intercity Railways 
Seitu Coleman 
3 
 
Figure 2.  Unlinked Passenger Trips on Transit Modes (roadway and fixed-guideway) from 1890 to 2013 (American 
Public Transportation Association [APTA], 2015, pp. 20-27). 
 
In Figure 2, transit enjoyed consistently high ridership figures in first two decades of the 20th 
century.  Ridership troughed in the 1930s (during the Great Depression) before cresting in the 
early 1940s (during World War II).  Ridership then slowly declined until the 1970s, and has 
since slowly increased.  While the reasons for the patterns presented in the above figures are 
numerous, they can mainly be attributable to 1) large subsidies dedicated towards highway and 
air travel infrastructure, 2) a decentralized pattern of urban form and density in major U.S. cities 
that is not practicable for common transit use, and 3) a lack of uniformly good service and 
accessibility to transit systems (Cranor, 2011; Walker, 2010; Dimitriou, 2001; Newman & 
Kenworthy, 2006; Fishman, 2005, pp. 358-359).  In particular, transit systems in U.S. cities are 
not nearly as extensive as those in cities where public transit plays a major role in transportation.  
 
2.2. Interest in Transit Grows 
 
Since the late 1990s, however, a small, but nonetheless significant shift in jobs and housing 
flows from outer suburban rings to inner city centers has been occurring in a number of U.S. 
metropolitan areas (Fishman, 2005, pp. 358-359).  To illustrate, the New York regional core 
(which includes the City of New York, Hudson, Essex, and Union Counties in New Jersey) lost 
population (eight percent) and jobs (6.6 percent) between 1969 and 1990, while the outer 
suburban ring region gained population (eleven percent) and jobs (56 percent) in the same period 
(Fishman, 2005, p. 359).  Yet, between 1990 and 2001, population growth in the regional core 
“matched that of the ring for the first time since World War II” (Fishman, 2005, p. 359).  In 
terms of job gains, the core matched the suburban ring with nine percent growth between 1996 
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and 2001 (Fishman, 2005, p. 359).  A similar shift in growth patterns has been observed in other 
U.S. cities such as Boston, San Francisco, Oakland, Chicago, and Los Angeles during the same 
period (Fishman, 2005, p. 359).  While the reasons for these shifts are not explicitly known, 
Dutzik, Inglis, & Baxandall (2014, pp. 1-3) provides several insights, including a shift in 
millennial’s (those born between 1983 and 2000) lifestyle preferences towards urban and 
walkable neighborhoods, and transportation using a variety of modes in order to save on fuel 
expenditures and to spend more time using portable technology devices.  Cities and states are 
also aware of the importance of having an adequate transportation system to induce social and 
economic transactions of their citizenry (Harriet, Poku, & Emmanuel, 2013, p. 225).  These 
transactions generally aggregate and contribute to economic growth and an increase in standard 
of living.  As the former mayor of Bogotá noted, however, “[t]ransport differs from other 
problems developing societies face, because it gets worse rather than better with economic 
development” (Suzuki, Murakami, Hong, & Tamayose, 2015, p. 2).  As societies develop, 
people’s wealth and incomes increase, and their choice of travel shifts from non-motorized 
modes to motorized modes, in particular the automobile (Suzuki, Murakami, Hong, & 
Tamayose, 2015, p. 2).  Since urbanized areas are by nature limited in space (Walker, 2012, p. 
17), and automobiles are inherently spatially inefficient, congestion becomes a common 
occurrence in developed cities (Norton, 2008, p. 139).  Cities and states would be interested in 
reducing congestion since it negatively affects economic development.  In 2011, there was 38 
hours of delay and 19 gallons of fuel wasted per capita in the U.S. (Schrank, Eisele, & Lomax, 
2012, p. 1).  Finally, it is becoming increasingly recognized by policymakers and the general 
public that transportation systems contribute greatly towards environmental degradation and the 
Alternative Institutional Arrangements for Urban Transit and Intercity Railways 
Seitu Coleman 
5 
 
release of greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere (United States Department of 
Transportation [DOT], 2010, p. ES-2; Cranor, 2011).  
 
Because of the above discussed reasons, there has been a renewed interest in investing in public 
transportation in the U.S.  Cities such as Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, and Denver are 
expanding their existing transit systems, while other cities including Dallas, Salt Lake City, 
Phoenix, and Charlotte have recently completed brand new systems (Neff & Dickens, 2013, p. 
11).  Figure 3 displays the trend of passenger-miles by transit mode in the United States between 
1990 and 2012. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Passenger-miles by transit mode in the U.S.  (BTS, 2014). 
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Minus a large dip in the mid-1990s, the utilization of buses (which includes motor buses and 
trolley buses) has remained relatively steady for the last 20 years at around 20 billion passenger-
miles.  Heavy rail, on the other hand, has experienced a remarkable increase in usage.  The 
number of passenger-miles has increased from 11.48 billion in 1990 to 17.52 billion in 2012, 
representing a 53 percent increase.  Light rail has also enjoyed an increase in usage, from 571 
million passenger-miles to over 2.3 billion passenger-miles in 2012.  This is a 306 percent 
increase in the number of passenger-miles.  When compared to highways and air travel, the 
transit utilization gains are still minimal, but an independent comparison of transit modes shows 
that significant ridership gains have been realized.   
 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that the increase in ridership is 
attributable to “population increases, periods of growth in employment, and increases in gasoline 
and parking prices” (2010, p. 8).  Transit agency officials have noted as well that ridership 
increases occurred due to transit agencies “expanding and enhancing their systems, adding new 
service, forming local partnerships, and launching marketing campaigns to increase ridership” 
(GAO, p. 8).  Another factor that has led to an increase in ridership over the years is an active 
approach by transit agencies to increase the potential number of riders working, living, and 
shopping near their lines by engaging in joint development and encouraging transit-oriented 
development (TOD) in their station areas. 
 
The increase in ridership, however, has required transit agencies to ramp up service and invest in 
line improvements to accommodate the extra demand.  This has resulted in an increase in 
operating and capital costs for transit agencies.  The GAO noted that “because public transit 
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riders do not pay for the full cost of their rides through passenger fares and revenues have not 
kept pace with operating costs, increased ridership has strained . . . transit system[s’] operating 
budget[s]” (2010, p. 13).  Additionally, expansions of public transit systems, especially those that 
utilize dedicated rights-of-way, are known to require huge amounts of public funds (Cabanatuan, 
2014; Richards, 2013).  After construction, such systems typically require ongoing subsidies 
because farebox revenues cover only a portion of their operating costs.  Figure 4 shows the 
percentage of each funding source for operating expenditures. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Funding sources for U.S. transit operations expenditures.  (GAO, 2010, p. 14). 
 
The proportions of funding increased at all government levels between 1998 and 2008, indicating 
a strong commitment to investing in public transit.  Nevertheless, the share of funding from other 
sources (e.g., advertising revenue) and fare revenue decreased.  With other funding sources and 
fare revenues covering only 47 percent and 37 percent of funding for 1998 and 2008 
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respectively, it seems that there is a chronic funding shortfall for transit operations.  Figure 5 
presents the contribution of each funding source to transit capital projects. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Funding sources for U.S. transit capital expenditures.  (GAO, 2010, p. 15). 
 
While the percentage of state funding remained static, federal funding declined while local 
funding increased between 1998 and 2008.  Other funding sources contributed one percent to 
capital expenditures in 2008, while fare revenues contributed zero percent in both 1998 and 
2008.  In essence, transit capital expenditures are almost entirely dependent on public 
investments.  Table 2 shows the farebox recovery ratio (i.e., fare revenues divided by operating 
expenditures) for 16 U.S. transit agencies in 2012.  The transit agencies are ranked according to 
greatest operating expenditures. 
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Ratio of Fare Revenues to Operating Expenditures of North American Transit Agencies for 2012 
Rank 
Operator (State) Fare Revenues Operating Expenditures Ratio 
1 NYCT (NY) $3,622,833,825 $6,685,391,347 0.54 
2 NJ Transit (NJ) $891,835,082 $1,890,514,517 0.47 
4 MBTA (MA) $472,185,325 $1,295,890,428 0.36 
3 WMATA (DC) $714,512,997 $1,513,176,930 0.47 
6 LACMTA (CA) $359,058,439 $1,245,808,764 0.29 
5 CTA (IL) $551,162,509 $1,283,092,210 0.43 
7 MTA LIRR (NY) $581,408,370 $1,163,468,650 0.50 
8 SEPTA (PA) $451,094,843 $1,163,326,950 0.39 
9 MTA-MNCR (NY) $588,121,687 $945,225,586 0.62 
10 MUNI (CA) $202,266,632 $646,619,295 0.31 
11 King County Metro (WA) $181,315,403 $630,539,306 0.29 
12 Metra (IL) $298,394,322 $627,591,444 0.48 
13 MTA (MD) $137,905,520 $597,623,138 0.23 
14 BART (CA) $366,474,018 $488,882,256 0.75 
15 DART (TX) $61,614,860 $450,030,313 0.14 
16 DTPW (PR) $44,904,968 $45,951,173 0.98 
Table 2.  Ratio of fare revenues to operating expenditures of North American Transit Agencies in 2012.  (National 
Transit Database [NTD], 2013). 
 
As Table 2 shows, none of the transit agencies’ fare revenues covered their operating 
expenditures.  The transit agency with the highest farebox recovery ratio of 0.75 was the San 
Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Authority (BART), while the Dallas Area Rapid Transit 
Authority (DART) had the lowest recovery ratio of 0.14.  The Department of Transportation and 
Public Works of Puerto Rico is included as an outlier with a recovery ratio of 0.98.  In order to 
understand the fiscal situations of the transit agencies in more detail, Table 3 and Table 4 display 
the operating revenues and operating margins by mode in 2012.  Note that in Table 3 and Table 
4, the modes under “railway” include street car rail, light rail, commuter rail, heavy rail, hybrid 
rail, and cable cars.  The modes under “bus” are motor bus, trolleybus, commuter bus, and bus 
rapid transit.  The “other” modes include demand response, vanpool, taxi, and ferryboat. 
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North American Transit Agencies Operating Revenues and Statistics in 2012 
Operator 
Passenger-
miles (million) 
Railway Revenues Bus Revenues Other Revenues 
Total Operating 
Revenues 
Million 
2012 
dollars 
Percentage 
Million 
2012 
dollars 
Percentage 
Million 
2012 
dollars 
Percentage 
Million 
2012 
dollars 
Percentage 
NYCT (NY) 12,189.81 2,742.05 76% 870.48 24% 10.30 0% 3,622.83 100% 
NJ Transit 
(NJ) 
3,082.68 528.74 59% 358.22 40% 4.87 1% 891.84 100% 
MBTA (MA) 1,845.57 376.15 80% 85.43 18% 10.61 2% 472.19 100% 
WMATA 
(DC) 
2,017.10 569.24 80% 137.45 19% 7.82 1% 714.51 100% 
LACMTA 
(CA) 
2,117.18 71.44 21% 272.57 79% - - 344.01 100% 
CTA (IL) 2,266.25 262.54 48% 288.62 52% - - 551.16 100% 
MTA LIRR 
(NY) 
2,083.40 581.41 100% - - - - 581.41 100% 
SEPTA (PA) 1,632.22 261.38 58% 183.67 41% 6.05 1% 451.09 100% 
MTA-MNCR 
(NY) 
2,438.20 587.49 100% 0.41 0% 0.22 0% 588.12 100% 
MUNI (CA) 468.71 70.64 35% 130.33 64% 1.29 1% 202.27 100% 
Metra (IL) 1,681.88 298.39 100% - - - - 298.39 100% 
King County 
Metro (WA) 
576.54 14.49 8% 155.17 86% 11.65 6% 181.32 100% 
DART (TX) 472.43 25.81 42% 32.53 53% 3.28 5% 61.61 100% 
MTA (MD) 818.31 60.27 44% 75.08 54% 2.55 2% 137.91 100% 
BART (CA) 1,545.72 366.47 100% - - - - 366.47 100% 
Table 3.  Operating revenues of transit agencies in North America.  (NTD, 2013). 
  
Alternative Institutional Arrangements for Urban Transit and Intercity Railways 
Seitu Coleman 
11 
 
Operating Profits and Loss of North American Transit Agencies in 2012 
Operator 
Railway Bus Other 
Operating Income 
in 2012 dollars 
Operating 
Income in 
millions of 
2012 dollars 
Operating 
Margin 
Operating 
Income in 
millions of 2012 
dollars 
Operating 
Margin 
Operating Income 
in millions of 2012 
dollars 
Operating 
Margin 
NYCT (NY) (1,002.03) -37% (1,631.49) -187% (429.04) -4163% (3,062.56) 
NJ Transit (NJ) (472.89) -89% (454.02) -127% (71.77) -1472% (998.68) 
MBTA (MA) (407.51) -108% (302.43) -354% (113.77) -1072% (823.71) 
WMATA (DC) (274.42) -48% (428.35) -312% (95.89) -1225% (798.66) 
LACMTA (CA) (235.59) -330% (651.94) -239% - - (887.53) 
CTA (IL) (252.47) -96% (479.46) -166% - - (731.93) 
MTA LIRR 
(NY) 
(582.06) -100% - - - - (582.06) 
SEPTA (PA) (242.88) -93% (426.10) -232% (43.25) -716% (712.23) 
MTA-MNCR 
(NY) 
(353.18) -60% (0.83) -205% (3.09) -1387% (357.10) 
MUNI (CA) (170.78) -242% (256.37) -197% (17.20) -1329% (444.35) 
Metra (IL) (329.20) -110% - - - - (329.20) 
King County 
Metro (WA) 
11.70 81% (332.29) -214% (59.86) -514% (380.44) 
DART (TX) (135.99) -527% (210.07) -646% (42.36) -1292% (388.42) 
MTA (MD) (133.69) -222% (256.19) -341% (69.83) -2740% (459.72) 
BART (CA) (122.41) -33% - - - - (122.41) 
Table 4.  Operating margins of transit agencies in North America.  (NTD, 2013). 
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From Table 3, the distribution of fare revenues from railways and bus revenues seems to display 
no pattern.  For some transit agencies, the fare revenues from each mode is almost evenly 
divided, while for other agencies, the figures are skewed with either railways or buses generating 
most of the revenues.  Revenues from other modes are meager for all of the transit agencies.  In 
addition, from Table 4, almost every mode under every transit agency operates at a loss (i.e., 
based on revenue from fares).  The highest operating margin of railways is negative 33 percent 
for BART, while the lowest is negative 527 percent for DART.  For buses, the highest operating 
margin is negative 127 percent for NJ Transit, while the lowest is negative 646 percent for 
DART.  With other modes, the highest operating margin is negative 514 percent at King County 
Metro, while the lowest is negative 4,163 percent at New York City Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority (NYCT).  Railways under King County Metro have the only positive operating 
margin.  This figure is a bit misleading as King County Metro does not carry out rail operations 
itself, but is contracted out by the Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority (Sound 
Transit) to run Link light rail service.  Overall, NYCT had the highest operating deficit at over 
$3.06 billion, while BART had the lowest operating deficit at over $122 million. 
 
While the arguments that for a given level of service, transit can handle extra passengers more 
cheaply than automobiles (Small, 1997, p. 674) and that rail subsidies are actually lower than 
automobile subsidies on a passenger-mile basis when considering both direct costs and indirect 
costs (Cranor, 2011) are valid, the reality is that governments can only spare a certain amount of 
available cash towards public transit expansions and operating subsidies in light of other public 
expenditures.  This limitation of funds can slow down and delay the expansion and 
improvements to public transit systems until more funds become available. 
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3. Premise 
 
3.1. Problem 
 
While the U.S. has invested substantial public funds in transit and passenger railway systems, 
such systems continually perform with negative operating margins, or deficits.  This makes it 
difficult for such systems to make modifications and improvements to services and amenities 
that might increase their ridership.  Additionally, the need to search for external sources of 
operating funds forces transit agencies to compete for limited funds with other public 
expenditures and puts them in a negative political light to taxpayers.  
 
3.2. Study Purpose 
 
The purpose of this study is to explore and examine alternative institutional arrangements that 
allow transit agencies and passenger railway companies to provide services on a profitable basis, 
and therefore on a more competitive basis. 
 
3.3. Study Methodology 
 
This study consisted of a literature review of the state of transit in the U.S. in terms of usage and 
funding levels relative to other modes of transportation.  Then, the institutional arrangements that 
allow transit and railway operators in Japan and Hong Kong to operate on a profitable basis was 
studied.  Finally, key principles of the institutional arrangements and their implications for the 
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U.S. are identified.  Recommendations of policy are provided for transit agencies to take 
advantage of the benefits of the alternative institutional arrangements. 
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4. Alternative Institutional Models 
 
4.1. Japan’s Private Railway Companies 
 
A different situation from the U.S. in terms of passenger ridership and availability of funds for 
transit agencies exists in East Asian cities, however.  In Japan and in Hong Kong, transit 
operators take a more commercial approach to their operations.  In the case of Japan,  
 
there are 149 private railway companies, 135 of which are engaged in passenger 
transport.  Of these 135, 15 are major companies.  The total length of line operated by the 
15 majors is 2,860 [kilometers (km)], or a mere 14 [percent] of the total length of line—
20,580 km—operated by the six [Japan Railways (JRs), which are the large privatized 
railway companies in charge of operating the national rail network leftover from the now 
defunct Japan National Railways (JNR)].  Nevertheless, the number of passengers carried 
by the 15 majors is equivalent to 89 percent of the total number of passengers transported 
by the six JRs, and their passenger-km reaches 45 percent of those of the six JRs.  In 
Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya, in particular, the 15 majors carry far more passengers than 
the JRs (60 [percent] vs. 40 [percent]), showing that the principal field of activity of the 
major private railway companies is big cities (Saito, 1997, p. 2). 
 
How is this possible?  Saito (1997, p. 3) attributes the success of the private railway companies 
to four factors, which include 1) efficient management, 2) a large, high-density market, 3) 
overcrowding during rush hours, and 4) business diversification.  Saito (1997, p. 3) focuses on 
Alternative Institutional Arrangements for Urban Transit and Intercity Railways 
Seitu Coleman 
16 
 
business diversification as a major factor to the railways’ success.  Indeed, the railway 
companies should not be thought of as just transportation businesses, but as major land 
developers that provide a wide variety of services to people who live along their lines (Saito, 
1997, p. 3).  The history of private railway companies in Japan began in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries, during which several railway booms (or rapid line extensions) occurred (Saito, 
1997, p. 3).  In the interest of nation building activities, such as transporting military goods, the 
Japanese government nationalized 17 private railway companies in 1906-1907 to create the state 
owned JNR (Saito, 1997, p. 3).  The remaining private railway companies were allowed to 
continue business as long as their operations did not interfere with that of JNR’s.  Given this 
situation, the private railway companies built lines that branched off from JNR’s main lines into 
rural areas.  They then “had to increase the population near their lines and attract as many 
passengers as possible by creating entertainment near their lines” (Saito, 1997, p. 4).  The first 
company to do so was Hanshin, which constructed a tram line between Osaka and Kobe in 1905 
and “developed residential areas, recreational facilities (spas, mountain-climbing sites, and 
playgrounds)[, and department stores] along the line” to build ridership (Saito, 1997, p. 4).  
Another extreme example is the Tokyu Group, which is “Japan’s largest private railway 
company group with about 400 affiliated companies and more than 100,000 employees” (Saito, 
p. 4, 1997).  Tokyu originated as a real-estate development company and entered the railway 
industry when it founded a railway company to build and operate a line that connected its 
developments to downtown Tokyo (Saito, p. 4, 1997).  Saito (p. 4, 1997) notes that Tokyu is a 
special case because most private railway companies started off as railway companies and 
branched into real-estate development and investment. 
 
Alternative Institutional Arrangements for Urban Transit and Intercity Railways 
Seitu Coleman 
17 
 
The company constructed the Den-en-toshi Line with a length of 20.1 km (15 stations) in 
the southwestern suburbs of Tokyo between 1963 and 1984.  At the same time, it 
developed Tama Den-en-toshi (Tama Garden City) with an area of about 5,000 [hectares 
(ha)] by levelling a huge hill along the line.  The population of the new town is now [as 
of 1997] almost 500,000 (Saito, p. 4, 1997). 
 
In 1977, the Den-en-toshi Line was connected with the Teito Rapid Transit Authority (TRTA) 
subway line, allowing Tokyu trains to run right into central Tokyo (Saito, p. 4, 1997).  Figure 6 
displays a map of the Greater Tokyo Area and its railway network. 
 
 
Figure 6.  A map of the railway network in the Greater Tokyo Metropolitan Area.  (“Tokyo Metro map kai,” 2013). 
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Private railway companies in Japan have also engaged in industries besides railways and real-
estate development.  This includes the operation of bus systems, taxis, and station area retail, and 
is shown by the operating figures of the 15 major private railway companies in Japan presented 
in Table 5 and Table 6. 
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Private Railway Company Operating Revenues and Company Statistics in 1994 
Company 
Line 
Length 
(mile) 
Passenger-
mile 
(million) 
Railway Revenues Bus Revenues Other Revenues 
Total Operating 
Revenues 
Million 
2012 
dollars 
Percentage 
Million 
2012 
dollars 
Percentage 
Million 
2012 
dollars 
Percentage 
Million 
2012 
dollars 
Percentage 
[Tokyo Area] 
 
Tobu 288.38 8,926.64 2,146.68 59% 536.67 15% 959.64 26% 3,642.99 100% 
Seibu 111.72 5,896.21 1,323.48 39% - - 2,096.65 61% 3,420.13 100% 
Keisei 56.86 2,398.50 777.72 59% 407.81 31% 122.80 9% 1,308.32 100% 
Keio 52.69 4,309.84 1,052.12 59% 322.91 18% 403.26 23% 1,778.29 100% 
Odakyu 75.56 6,824.54 1,449.31 63% 10.61 0% 855.03 37% 2,314.96 100% 
Tokyu 62.57 5,442.60 1,599.40 40% - - 2,416.53 60% 4,015.93 100% 
Keikyu 52.07 3,899.11 932.35 46% 362.33 18% 712.53 35% 2,007.21 100% 
Sotetsu 21.75 1,754.14 427.52 21% 134.93 7% 1,432.64 72% 1,995.08 100% 
[Osaka area] 
 
Kintetsu 369.22 9,477.18 2,869.82 74% 154.63 4% 827.75 21% 3,852.20 100% 
Nankai 107.06 3,129.23 996.02 56% 186.47 11% 585.18 33% 1,767.68 100% 
Keihan 57.10 3,305.08 911.13 57% - - 686.76 43% 1,597.88 100% 
Hankyu 90.84 6,424.37 1,570.59 58% - - 1,117.30 42% 2,687.90 100% 
Hanshin 28.02 1,358.94 438.13 41% 81.86 8% 553.35 52% 1,073.34 100% 
[Nagoya/Fukuoka 
areas]  
Meitetsu 335.11 4,544.10 1,241.62 55% 338.07 15% 683.72 30% 2,263.41 100% 
Nishitetsu 75.25 1,298.05 385.07 17% 1,141.56 51% 724.66 32% 2,251.28 100% 
[Reference] 
 
JR East 4,661.54 79,625.19 28,384.38 96% - - 1,244.65 4% 29,629.03 100% 
JR Central 1,232.49 30,762.92 16,964.22 92% - - 1,459.92 8% 18,424.15 100% 
JR West 3,150.42 34,476.24 12,968.01 98% - - 281.98 2% 13,249.98 100% 
TRTA 100.79 9,868.02 3,958.32 98% - - 63.67 2% 4,021.99 100% 
Table 5.  Operating revenues of railway companies.  Modified from (Saito, 1997, p. 5). 
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Operating Profits and Loss of Major Private Railway Companies in 1994 
Company 
Railway Bus Other 
Operating 
Profit in 
millions of 
2012 
dollars 
Operating 
Income in 
millions of 
2012 
dollars 
Operating 
Margin 
Operating 
Income in 
millions of 
2012 
dollars 
Operating 
Margin 
Operating 
Income in 
millions of 
2012 
dollars 
Operating 
Margin 
Tobu 227.40 44% (32.14) -6% 325.79 63% 521.05 
Seibu 216.94 52% - - 197.39 48% 414.33 
Keisei 128.10 87% (5.31) -4% 24.56 17% 147.36 
Keio 167.22 60% (3.79) -1% 114.91 41% 278.34 
Odakyu 212.55 51% 2.43 1% 203.75 49% 418.72 
Tokyu 309.12 49% - - 326.25 51% 635.36 
Keikyu 148.27 55% (10.01) -4% 129.77 48% 268.03 
Sotetsu 68.83 28% (16.07) -7% 189.50 78% 242.26 
Kintetsu 243.17 51% (21.68) -5% 252.11 53% 473.60 
Nankai 122.49 44% (18.95) -7% 174.34 63% 277.89 
Keihan 100.66 49% - - 106.42 51% 207.09 
Hankyu 132.35 42% - - 181.47 58% 313.82 
Hanshin 41.84 22% 1.97 1% 142.20 76% 186.02 
Meitetsu 109.76 43% (18.80) -7% 166.46 65% 257.42 
Nishitetsu 36.84 25% 11.67 8% 96.42 67% 144.93 
Table 6.  Operating profits for major private railway companies in Japan.  Modified from (Saito, 1997). 
 
The original numbers from Saito (1997, pp. 5-6) were converted from 1994 Japanese yen to 1994 
US dollars, and then to 2012 US dollars using the Consumer Price Index (Forecast-Chart.com, 
2012; Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014).  From Table 5, it can be seen that some companies focus 
their efforts on functions other than railways.  Seibu, Tokyu, and Hanshin, for instance, have 
chosen to focus their businesses on real-estate development and other services.  Seibu and Tokyu 
do not even operate buses.  On the contrary, Keisei and Nishitetsu earn a respectable portion of 
their revenues from bus operations.  One key feature is that the railway branches of all the 
companies more than make up for their operating expenditures, as shown in Table 6.  The 
highest operating profit on railway operating expenditures is 87 percent for Keisei, while the 
lowest is 22 percent for Hanshin.  Another feature to note is that branches of private railway 
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companies that specialize in bus operations seem to either be marginally profitable or 
unprofitable.  It can be guessed that bus operations act as feeders and allow the companies to 
attract patronage to their other services, thereby increasing operating profits for the branches that 
provide those other services. Since it appears that bus operations generally pay for themselves, 
there is little to no net loss to the companies’ overall operating margins.  In general, the private 
railway companies are able provide the important social service of transportation in a way that 
does not strain local governments of their cash assets, but actually provides them with massive 
tax revenues (Shoji, n.d. p. 3). 
 
4.2. Hong Kong’s Mass Transit Railway Corporation 
 
In Hong Kong, a similar approach to transit operations is done by MTRC.  MTRC is the main 
transit operator for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR).  Founded in 1975, 
MTRC was solely state-owned until 2000, when 23 percent of its shares were sold to private 
shareholders (Cervero & Murakami, 2008, p. 8).  The entrance of private shareholders 
incentivized MTRC to adopt a more commercial and entrepreneurial approach to its operations 
(Cervero & Murakami, 2008, p. 8).  In particular, the company’s R + P program was accelerated 
and broadened (Cervero & Murakami, 2008, p. 8).  In the R + P process, the Hong Kong 
government gives exclusive development rights to MTRC around and above its station areas in 
the form of land grants (Cervero & Murakami, 2008, p. 10).  MTRC then develops the land and 
capitalizes on the premium, or the difference between the “before rail” price and “after rail” 
price, that the land gains (Cervero & Murakami, 2008, p. 10).  In the U.S., this process is known 
as “value capture.”  Cervero & Murakami note that R + P has been lucrative enough for MTRC 
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that it is able to cover the costs of railway investments and future line extensions without direct 
financial help from the Hong Kong government (2008, pp. 11-14).  For example, in the 1980s, 
although MTRC was operating at a loss, income from its R + P projects curtailed some of the 
losses (Cervero & Murakami, 2008, p. 13).  In the 1990s, MTRC expanded its R + P program 
and debt financed the construction of the Airport Line with income from R + P investments 
(Cervero & Murakami, 2008, p. 13).  Additionally, revenue from R + P developments along the 
Airport Line helped finance the construction of the Tseung Kwan O Line (Cervero & Murakami, 
2008, p. 13).  Figure 7 shows the MTRC Hong Kong railway network in 2009.  As of 2014, 
MTRC is planning the opening of seven new lines and extensions (MTR Corporation, 2014). 
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Figure 7.  MTRC network in Hong Kong SAR.  (“Hong Kong MTR system map,” 2009). 
 
Table 7 presents the type and size (in gross floor area [GFA]) of land development and 
investment projects that MTRC has been involved with. 
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Property Development Overview of MTRC in 2006 
Type of Land 
Use 
Residential Commercial Office 
Units GFA (ft2) Percentage GFA (ft2) Percentage GFA (ft2) Percentage 
Urban Lines 341,022.23 35% 3,389,803.18 43% 2,248,215.06 25% 
Airport Line 308,386.05 32% 3,300,645.70 42% 6,587,115.33 74% 
Tweung 
Kwan O Line 
313,951.00 33% 1,138,972.49 15% 53,819.56 1% 
Total 963,359.28 100% 7,829,421.37 100% 8,889,149.94 100% 
Type of Land 
Use 
Hotel/Service Apartments 
Government & 
Institutions 
Total 
Number of 
Carparks 
Units GFA (ft2) Percentage GFA (ft2) Percentage GFA (ft2) Spaces 
Urban Lines - - 1,539,605.26 85% 7,518,645.73 6,012 
Airport Line 3,140,069.68 83% 266,622.08 15% 13,602,838.84 14,360 
Tweung 
Kwan O Line 
625,706.15 17% N/A - 2,132,449.19 6,547 
Total 3,765,775.83 100% 1,806,227.34 100% 23,253,933.76 26,919 
Table 7.  Overview of MTRC property development.  Modified from (Cervero & Murakami, 2008, p. 12). 
 
Similar to the private railway companies in Japan, MTRC has also diversified its projects to 
include “equity ownership, cash holdings, property management, consulting, advertising, and 
ownership of other assets (e.g., telecommunications leases, [and] convenience retail shops)” in 
order to be more robust against cyclical swings in the economy and earn revenues from a variety 
of ventures (Cervero & Murakami, 2008, p. 13).  For example, between 2001 and 2005, MTRC 
received revenues from property development (52 percent), railway fares (28 percent), property 
investment and management (ten percent), and non-fare sources (ten percent) (Cervero & 
Murakami, 2008, p. 13).  In light of this, Cervero & Murakami also note that 
 
MTRC has hardly been the sole financial beneficiary of R + P.  Society at large reflected 
by Hong Kong SAR’s majority ownership of MTRC, has also reaped substantial rewards.  
For the 1980 to 2005 period, it is estimated that Hong Kong SAR has received nearly 
$140 billion (in [2008] Hong Kong dollars[,or $19.17 billion in 2012 U.S. dollars]) in net 
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financial returns.  This is based on the difference between earned income ($171.8 billion 
[or $23.53 billion in 2012 U.S.] from land premiums, market capitalization, shareholder 
cash dividends, and initial public offer[ing] proceeds) and the value of injected equity 
capital ($32.2 billion[ or $4.41 billion in 2012 U.S.]).  Thus the government of Hong 
Kong has enjoyed tremendous finance[ial] returns and seeded the construction of a 
world-class railway network without having to advance any cash to MTRC.  The $140 
billion figure, of course, is only the direct financial benefit.  The indirect benefits—e.g., 
higher ridership through increased densities, reduced sprawl, air pollution, and energy 
consumption, etc.—have increased net societal returns well beyond $140 billion (2008, p. 
14). 
 
Again, as in Japan, Hong Kong has enjoyed the expansion and operation of a high quality transit 
system that hardly burdens the local government of any resources. 
 
4.3. The Connection between Transportation and Land Use 
 
While the financial successes that MTRC in Hong Kong and Japanese private railway companies 
have enjoyed are great, it should be noted that their achievements were possible because they 
took advantage of a relationship between transportation and land use.  This relationship is known 
as the transportation-land use dynamic, and is presented in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8.  The transportation-land use dynamic.  (Giuliano, 1995, p. 307). 
 
Giuliano provides the following analysis of the dynamic: 
 
The characteristics of the transportation system determine accessibility, or the ease of 
moving from one place to another.  Accessibility in turn affects the location of activities, 
or the land use pattern.  The location of activities in space affects daily activity patterns, 
which in turn result in travel patterns (daily trips within the region).  These travel 
patterns, expressed as flows on the transportation network, affect the transportation 
system (1995, p. 307). 
 
What should be taken from the dynamic is that transportation and land use are interdependent.  
For example, one should typically not wait until after an area has been developed to create a 
transportation system because doing so may physically disturb the developments and cost more 
than if the system had been planned and built before the developments.  Similarly, one should 
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not build a transportation system in an area where there are no developments or any 
developments planned for in the future because its utility would be low.  In general, 
transportation and land use are interdependent and feed off of each other, and should be planned 
together. 
 
Tang, Chiang, Baldwin, & Yeung (2005) show a similar finding of the connection between 
transportation (railway) and land use (property) in Figure 9.  In this case, the connection is 
related to the railway and property development model that MTRC and Japanese private railways 
use.   
 
Alternative Institutional Arrangements for Urban Transit and Intercity Railways 
Seitu Coleman 
28 
 
 
Figure 9.  A model of the synergy between railways and property development.  (Tang, Chiang, Baldwin, & Yeung, 
2005, p. 3). 
 
The integration of railway and property development, or R + P, is used to take advantage of the 
fact that a single entity absorbs the externalities that are associated with transportation 
investments and land developments.  This integration results in two benefits: 1) Optimization of 
the scale of both transportation investments and property developments and 2) the minimization 
of transaction costs.  Transportation investments typically involve huge upfront costs and need to 
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be justified by a high expectancy of utilization after construction.  Transit in particular operates 
most efficiently only when patronage is very high.  On the other hand, land developments are 
often limited in scale because of the potential traffic congestion they might generate on a 
transportation system.  Roads and highways only have so much capacity, especially when the 
majority of traffic is single-occupancy vehicles.  In order to prevent congestion, they either need 
to be widened to add more lanes, or have their surrounding land uses.  With either option, the 
effects on the environment are great as much land area is needed.  When R + P is used, a single 
entity plans for transit and land use in tandem and can balance the intensity of land use with high 
capacity transit to maximize the utility and value capture from the entire investment. 
 
It is also important to note the institutional relations that take place under R + P to optimize the 
scale of transportation investments and property development.  Tang, Chiang, Baldwin, & Yeung 
(2005, p. 7) depict two models of institutions regarding railway and property development in 
Figure 10. 
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Figure 10.  Two models of railway and property development.  (Tang, Chiang, Baldwin, & Yeung, 2005, p. 7). 
 
Model A in Figure 10 represents a traditional model of railway and property development where 
there is no lead institution undertaking the project.  Under this model, “the statutory town plans, 
land lease documents, . . . government land sale [programs], and . . . government policies and 
regulations provide the principal coordinating mechanisms in bringing together all the key 
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players in developing the sites” (Tang, Chiang, Baldwin, & Yeung, 2005, p. 8).  Notice that the 
arrows, representing a relation between two parties, do not all point to one place.  In Model B, 
MTRC is the lead coordinator between all of the relevant parties in a development.  Tang, 
Chiang, Baldwin, & Yeung (2005, p. 8) state that Model B 
 
does not obviate the need for statutory town plans, land lease documents, government 
policies and regulations, but unlike [Model A], they only frame rather than dictate all the 
development particulars.  The site development details are expected to be worked out by 
the MTRC in negotiation and consultation with the government departments and the 
developers.  Exclusive development rights for the station sites are granted to the MTRC 
and this provides an incentive for the corporation to plan and develop the sites in such a 
way as to maximize the values of its entire development projects and “internalize” all 
possible external benefits generated from railway and property development.  The MTRC 
provides the platform for the resolution of conflicting interests of all the relevant parties 
in connection with the site development. 
 
Although Tang, Chiang, Baldwin, & Yeung’s models are specific to Hong Kong, the same 
concept can be applied to Japan’s private urban railway companies with a slight modification in 
that the companies are also developers.  Nevertheless, in both cases, the scale of both 
transportation and property developments are planned carefully to bring out the full potential of 
the investments. 
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R + P also minimizes the transaction costs between transportation and land use planning.  It is 
important to keep transaction costs low in order to increase the chance of success of a project.  
Tang, Chiang, Baldwin, & Yeung (2005, p. 15) note that “conflicting objectives can be more 
effectively resolved when the decisions are put under a company hierarchy,” turning a “zero-sum 
game” between two conflicting parties into a “trade-offs” decision within a single firm.  For 
example, in a complex that includes a transit station and shopping mall, property planners would 
want to design pathways so that as many pedestrians pass by and are retained by as many retail 
shops as possible (Tang, Chiang, Baldwin, & Yeung, 2005, p. 14).  On the other hand, 
transportation planners would want to design pathways that provide for the smooth and quick 
flow of pedestrians as much as possible (Tang, Chiang, Baldwin, & Yeung, 2005, p. 14).  If the 
two types of planning are done by different organizations, the costs of planning property and 
transportation would be greater than if the two types of planning were done by the same 
organization (Tang, Chiang, Baldwin, & Yeung, 2005, p. 14).  In another example, Mizutani & 
Nakamura (2004, p. 308) discuss the reasons that Japan did not opt to vertically separate its 
railways during the privatization of JNR.  Vertical separation of railways, a policy that the 
European Union promotes through EU Directive 91/440, generally refers to the separation of 
responsibilities of train operations and right-of-way maintenance to different entities and allows 
for the open access of train operations in order to entice competition (EU Directive 91/440, 
2014).  Instead, Japan opted to vertically integrate its railways (i.e., trains are operated and the 
right-of-way is maintained by the same entity).   
 
[A]s the case of British Rail indicates, the division of track from trains becomes 
problematic because an adversarial relationship has developed between the central track 
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authorities and the train-operating companies.  Problems associated with vertical 
separation include high transaction costs, a need for monitoring of the other’s 
performance, the difficulty in creating complex performance schedules, and the 
stimulation of incentives for the track authority to invest in new facilities to increase 
efficiency and improve safety (Mizutani & Nakamura, 2004, p. 308). 
 
While vertical separation is intended to encourage railway operators to reduce their costs from 
competition with other operators, the high transaction costs of vertical separation may actually 
diminish some of the savings from competition.  In general, “[t]he transaction costs in reaching a 
settlement within a firm are much lower than between separate companies,” and R + P manages 
to reduce the transaction costs between different entities involved in a transit and property 
development project. 
 
4.4. Station Area Partnerships 
 
It would be of interest to look at the arrangements of station area management in R + P.  Among 
the stakeholders, who pays for what, and who manages what in a transit station after opening 
likely affects the success of an R + P project.  In the case of North America, it was stated by Hall 
& Weeks (2014, metropolitan planning meeting) that transit agencies usually do not engage in 
property development or investment directly because of their lack of expertise in the practices.  
Property development and investment are most commonly procured through sub-contracting 
with private sector stakeholders.  In Japan, the entire process of R + P, from purchasing the land 
to developing station areas is handled by private railway companies and their subsidiaries with 
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some financial help from the national government.  A look into MTRC’s approach, however, 
may give a better understanding to how transit operators in North America can benefit more 
directly from their investments. 
 
As mentioned above, MTRC is jointly-owned by the public and private shareholders.  This gives 
it the incentive to maximize the return from its investments and adjust to changing market 
conditions from commercial principles, while also preserving the public interest in its 
investments (Tang, Chiang, Baldwin, & Yeung, 2005, pp. 8-11).  Within the station area, MTRC 
takes the role of planning and coordinator of development, transit operator, and property 
manager.  According to Tang, Chiang, Baldwin, & Yeung (2005, p. 11),  
 
[d]evelopers agree to offer a sharing of their profits from the above-station development 
projects [(i.e., air-rights development)], when the MTRC invites them for tender.  The 
MTRC is required to shoulder both development as well as financial risks in this process 
as the profit sharing is highly sensitive to the market conditions . . . . [T]he corporation is 
required to pay full [“after rail”] market premiums to the government for the property 
development rights.  The market premiums are [then] levied on the property developers 
who are susceptible to the market environment. 
 
Put another way, the Hong Kong government assists MTRC in acquiring right-of-way and 
station areas at a price that does not reflect accessibility to transit service (i.e., “before rail” 
price).  Upon construction of the transit infrastructure and station area development, the Hong 
Kong government demands the added value of the land from accessibility to transit service (i.e., 
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“after rail” price) from MTRC, which MTRC demands from the developers.  Under this system, 
MTRC is the entity that assumes the risk from the project, rather than the central government or 
developers.  There are two benefits that result from this.  Firstly, since MTRC is the master 
planner and designer of the station area, MTRC will want to make sure that the station area is 
designed in such a way to encourage as much transit ridership and high occupancy rates of 
developments as possible.  To do this,  
 
[b]y means of “Development Agreements,” the MTRC will control, monitor and 
supervise [the] implementation of the adopted master plan proposals of the station 
development by the developers which have won the subject tender.  The Development 
Agreements stipulate, in great details, the conditions, responsibilities and duties to be 
fulfilled by the developers as the implementation agent of the MTRC.  Most developers 
describe the conditions of Development Agreements as very “harsh.”  Nonetheless, the 
Development Agreements perform an important function in ensuring that good quality 
development product will come out in the end. 
 
Secondly, as MTRC is both the transit operator and property manager of the station area after 
construction, it will be encouraged to maintain transit service and the station area property in as 
good of a state as possible to retain patronage.  Figure 11 and Table 8 show the responsibilities 
that separate stakeholders in a MTRC station area project assume.   
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Figure 11.  The components of a station area development with MTRC.  (Cervero & Murakami, 2008, p. 72). 
 
Project Components 
Residential 
Towers 
Mall and 
Retail 
Bridge 
Office Hotel Town Square 
Government and 
Community 
Public Transport 
Interchange 
1) Construction Developer based on railway/ development coordinated design; enabling works provided by MTRC (multiple packages) 
2) Mechanism for 
sharing costs & profit 
Developer paid land premium and development 
cost 
Part of the property design Conditions in land grant 
Investment return split by up-front profit and end-
profit sharing 
3) Ownership of asset 
Individual flat 
owners 
Developer 
Common area of the mall 
and Public Transport 
Interchange 
Government 
4) Management MTRC Developer 
Hotel 
operator 
Developer 
Government delegated to operator 
(MTRC) 
Table 8.  The partnership responsibilities in a station area development project.  Modified from (Cervero & Murakami, 2008, p. 72). 
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Note that Figure 10 and Table 8 present only one example of an arrangement between station 
area project stakeholders.  Each station may have a different arrangement.  Also, the public 
transport interchange is the area immediately outside of the transit station area that facilitates 
transfer between different modes of transportation.  In the case of Japanese private railway 
companies, it is likely that the arrangement is very similar to that of MTRC, except that more 
responsibilities fall to subsidiaries of the main company.   
 
To demonstrate the quality of transit service, depending on the line and time of day, MTRC can 
have train headways range from about 20 minutes to as low as two minutes (MTRC, 2014).  The 
Tokyo Metro, formerly known as TRTA, operates one of two subway systems in central Tokyo 
(the other being Toei Subway), serving 179 stations on nine lines that make up a network of 
121.2 miles (Tokyo Metro, 2014).  Along with its own trains, many Japanese private railway 
companies operate through-service trains coming from Tokyo’s suburbs on Tokyo Metro’s lines, 
resulting in train headways that range from a high of six minutes at off-peak hours to a low of 
one minute and 50 seconds at peak hours (Kimura, 2013, p. 10).   
 
A discourse on station area design also reveals a difference in thinking and extent of the function 
of stations between North America and other parts of the world.  Arcady, quoted by Tillier 
(2009), states: 
 
There’s a big difference in philosophy between European and American station design.  
In Europe, the trains are within the overall architectural space defined by the station, in 
the grandest examples a big steel and glass arch covering the tracks and platforms.  In 
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America, the station is separate and distinct from the tracks, which are off to the side in 
what is basically a train yard.  In Europe, passengers wait on the platform, and it’s not 
unusual to see, say, a coffee shop right on the platform.  In America, probably because of 
the tradition of low platforms and train-yard style stations, trains and passengers are kept 
separate until it’s actually time for boarding, at which point the passengers go out of the 
station and to the train, oftentimes walking directly across other tracks.  Hence, in even 
the grandest of US stations (Grand Central for example), the track area is generally ugly 
and utilitarian. 
 
A picture of the main railway station in Berlin, Germany, taken by Ephemeron 1 (2008) and 
presented by Tillier (2009), furthers the point of the above discussion in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12.  Berlin’s main railway station.  (Ephemeron 1, 2008). 
 
The point presented by Tillier (2009) is that train stations outside of North America function not 
only as transportation nodes, but also as commercial and social centers in their spheres of 
influence.  This dual function is reflected in the urban design and orientation of the station, 
which often is built within the same building of a large commercial-hotel-residential complex.  
This is in contrast to North American examples where the station is off to the side and distinctly 
separate from other developments, as shown in Figure 13 and Figure 14. 
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Figure 13.  An example of joint development.  In both cases, the station is off to the side.  (GAO, 2010, p. 6). 
 
 
Figure 14.  “Transit-Adjacent Developments” around Valley Transit Authority light rail in San Jose, California.  
(Cervero & Murakami, 2008, p. 27). 
 
While reasons for the compartmentalization of North American station are not explicitly known, 
three reasons for this phenomenon can be guessed at.  Firstly, the United States is a country of 
huge expanse, relative to many Western European and East Asian countries.  Stations could 
therefore be built on larger plots that afforded the luxury of compartmentalizing functions and 
separating waiting areas from platform areas.  Secondly, train service in the United States has 
generally not been known to operate at high frequencies (number of trains per hour), meaning 
that headways (time between trains) can be much greater than that of other countries.  Thus, as 
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demonstrated by Amtrak, trains in the United States may spend several minutes boarding 
passengers.  This allows enough time for passengers in the waiting area to walk over to the 
platform area and board their train, whereas on train systems where trains can afford to only 
spend less than a minute boarding passengers, passengers are allowed to wait on the platform so 
that they are closer to the train, and hence take less time boarding the train.  Finally, in the case 
of intercity rail, noise generated by the propulsion unit of trains can be a nuisance to waiting 
passengers.  As Figure 15 shows, at lower speeds, diesel-electric propulsion tends to emit 
considerably more noise at lower speeds relative to electric traction propulsion.  This is 
explained by the fact that at lower speeds, locomotive exhaust noise and air conditioning unit 
noise dominates as ambient noise.  As speeds increase, noise from the interaction of the rails and 
wheels and air turbulence noise begins to overwhelm other noise sources (FTA, 2006, pp. 2-6–2-
7). 
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Figure 15.  Relative sound levels emitted according to relative speed.  (FTA, 2006, p. 2-6). 
 
It can also be noted that the intensity of the land uses around a station can affect the potential 
demand of ridership, encouraging MTRC and Japanese private railways to develop their station 
areas to extremely high densities.  Figure 16 shows Tung Chung Station along the MTRC line.  
A central plaza with urban design elements exists outside of Tung Chung station.  In addition, 
high-density residential developments are visible near the station.   
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Figure 16.  Tung Chung Station and surrounding developments.  (Hokachung, n.d.). 
 
Tung Chung Station opened in conjunction with a line of the same name in 1998.  Judging by the 
land use data presented in Table 9, the station serves a predominantly residential neighborhood.  
This, as well as the fact that the station is only 35 minutes away from the central business 
district, suggests that ridership patterns at the station exhibit those of bedroom communities (i.e. 
high peaking at rush hours) (Cervero & Murakami, 2008, p. A2-16).  51,303 passengers per day 
use the station (Cervero & Murakami, 2008, p. A2-16). 
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Tung Chung R + P Station Area 
Land Use Make-up GFA (ft2) Percentage 
Residential 935,910 91.0% 
Office 14,999 1.5% 
Hotel 55,862 5.4% 
Others 22,000 2.1% 
Total 1,028,771 100% 
Parking Spaces 3,869 
Table 9.  Statistics on the Tung Chung Station Area.  Modified from (Cervero & Murakami, 2008, p. A2-16). 
 
Most of the housing is located within 80 meters (262.47 feet) of the station (Cervero & 
Murakami, 2008, p. A2-16).  26.7 percent of the housing is private (Cervero & Murakami, 2008, 
p. A2-16).  With a gross floor area of 103.08 hectares and site area of 21.70 hectares, the floor-
to-area ratio for the station area is 4.75 (Cervero & Murakami, 2008, p. A2-16).  Note that this is 
on the low side of floor-to-area ratios for R + P projects, with the highest reaching 14.84 
(Cervero & Murakami, 2008, p. 39). 
 
Figure 17 displays station area property developments by the Tokyu Group around Shibuya 
Station in Tokyo.  Shibuya Station first opened in 1885 to serve the western portion of Tokyo 
(Shibuya Station, 2014).  Today, the station serves as one of the main transfer points between the 
western and southwestern suburbs of Tokyo and central Tokyo (Shibuya Station, 2014).  The 
station is served by five railway operators on five separate lines and has an average count of over 
3.06 million passengers per day, making it Japan’s fourth-busiest railway station (Shibuya 
Station, 2014).  Figure 18 shows a bus facility outside Shibuya Station.  The left side of the 
photo shows one of the train lines entering the station complex. 
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Figure 17.  Station area developments by the Tokyu Group.  (Tokyu Group, 2013). 
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Figure 18.  Outside of Shibuya Station in Tokyo, Japan.  (“Shibuya Station West Exit Bus Terminal,” n.d.).  
 
The potential for station area design is very high for North America. 
 
4.5. Lessons for the U.S. 
 
After a review of the literature on value capture, joint development and transit-oriented 
developments in North America, it became evident that most of the literature does not discuss the 
integration of transit operations and property development to the extent of the R + P process, but 
rather focused on coordination (Wolf & Symington, 2009; GAO, 2010; Federal Transit 
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Administration [FTA], 2013; Becker, Bernstein, & Young, 2013; Central Puget Sound Regional 
Transit Authority [Sound Transit], 2014).  The GAO stated that “[s]pecifically, transit agencies 
are responsible for building, maintaining, and operating transit, but need to coordinate with local 
and state governments that generally have authority over taxation, land use, and development” 
(2010, p. 23).  Wolfe & Symington (2009) noted that one of the challenges to implementation of 
transit projects is the lack of common interests from various stakeholders.  It was suggested that 
in large regions a consolidation of multiple agencies that have the authority to issue permits into 
one regional government might improve coordination between the sub-regions (Wolfe & 
Symington, 2009, p. 33).  Wolfe & Symington (2009, p. 33) also proposed that a “greater level 
of regional coordination or consolidation” of seven transit agencies in the four-county Seattle 
metropolitan region “could improve service, planning and reduce overhead costs.”  However, 
Wolfe & Symington (2009) did not mention combining the different types of roles into one 
entity.  Most of the literature assumed that the transit agency is relegated to just the 
responsibilities of ownership and operation of transit facilities.  Also, design of station areas was 
master planned not by the transit agency, but by local governments.  Finally, property 
development and investment was left to private developers and property owners.  As a note, 
coordination between agencies with different roles may not be as effective as integrating select 
roles into a single agency because of transaction costs, as discussed above.  On a tour of Sound 
Transit’s light rail extension projects (i.e. East Link and University Link), a representative of 
Sound Transit was asked if Sound Transit would engage in management and investment of 
property developed around the new transit stations.  The representative responded that “We like 
to stick with doing the ‘T’ in TOD” and that it would not be in the interest of Sound Transit as a 
public agency to engage in property development or investment (2014).  Furthermore, the 
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representative stated that property development and investment should be left to the private 
sector (2014).  From this answer, there seems to be a general reluctance of transit agencies in 
North America to admittedly engage in commercial activities and privatization.  The source of 
this reluctance is not known.  A review of a draft FTA circular on guiding joint development for 
transit agencies contained no restrictions of transit agencies engaging in commercial activities, 
minus using FTA awarded funds for specifically supporting commercial activities (2013).  In 
fact, the circular appeared to encourage private stakeholder involvement in joint development 
projects.  The FTA circular states: 
 
While the statute prohibits FTA from outfitting a commercial space, FTA funds may be 
used to construct the “shell” of a facility that will be occupied by a commercial entity, as 
long as the statutory eligibility criteria are met.  To illustrate, FTA funds could be used to 
construct a facility that would be occupied by a coffee shop or news stand in exchange 
for rent payments.  FTA could assist in the construction of the overall facility that 
includes the commercial space, but could not pay for seating in the commercial areas, 
shelving, countertops, or other commercial equipment.  (Note: as discussed above, 
occupants of a facility must pay a fair share of the costs of the facility through rental 
payments or other means) (2013, p. III-9). 
 
Clearly, FTA does not discourage commercialization.  Shoji (n.d., pp. 2-3), however, provides 
the following analysis: 
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A public transport system has two basic objectives that it is expected to achieve 
simultaneously—to serve the public interest and to be profitable [(or, at least to be cost 
effective given the public investment)].  However, the two objectives can sometimes be 
in conflict.  In such cases, the policy must focus either on the public interest or on 
profitability.  The choice significantly determines how the system evolves because any 
improvements will be based on the chosen principle.  For example, the operator may 
choose to promote mobility and accessibility by striving to develop and maintain a 
system that is fair to society as a whole while respecting budgetary limitations.  Or the 
operator may promote commercial objectives according to the self-supporting principle 
while making exceptions in special cases. 
 
As described above, the general worldwide trend has been for urban public transit 
systems to take the first approach.  This has helped maintain public transit systems that 
offer relatively low fares and generate large networks.  However, the public-interest 
approach has led to several problems such as inefficiencies in management and 
operations, and inefficiencies in services.  Today, far-reaching reforms are being 
introduced worldwide to correct these problems.  Such reforms have been made 
necessary by budgetary restrictions to control excess subsidies, worsening government 
finances, and a change in public opinion especially among taxpayers. 
 
The act of deciding which is the better option—the public interest approach or the self-
supporting principle—is not up to the author, transit agencies, or private property developers, but 
the general public under representation by their local and regional governments.  According to 
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Freemark (2012), privatization of railways has led to mixed results globally.  Some countries 
have experienced success while others have not, and some forms of privatization appeared to 
work better than others.  Saito (1997, p. 9) states that Japanese private railway companies’  
 
aggressive management based on railway transport and community development was 
sometimes criticized as giving priority to profits rather than public good.  However, after 
1970, as the financial difficulties of JNR and publicly-managed railways worsened, the 
efficient and economically rational management of private railway companies gradually 
received high recognition. 
 
In retrospect, MTRC and Japanese private railways do seem capable of offering a high-quality 
lifestyle within their developments and railway lines.  The majority of MTRC is owned by the 
Hong Kong government, preserving an incentive to provide services that benefits the public at 
large.  Even Japanese private railway companies have had to work closely with local and 
regional governments when engaging in major property developments and transportation projects 
due to high investment risk (Saito, 1997, p. 9).  Also, the fares of Japanese railway companies 
are strictly regulated by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport (MLIT) by way of 
the full cost principle with a ceiling price and yardstick regulation (Mizutani & Nakamura, 2004, 
pp. 33-34; Mizutani, 2010, pp. 12-17).  This limits rail fares from increasing too quickly over 
time.  Shoji (n.d., p. 5) mentions that another regulation of private railway companies is the 
“Railway Accounting Ordinance (Tetsudo kaikei kisoku) which controls the allocation of rail and 
non-rail costs by making cross-subsidization unlawful.”  This means that the railway section of a 
company cannot be financially helped by the property development division of the company and 
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vice versa.  How this affects the behavior of companies is not deeply discussed or explained 
clearly and is a topic that should be investigated more thoroughly. 
 
In regard to joint development and value capture in North America, experience has shown that 
the revenue generated by actual projects has not lived up to potential.  The GAO (2010, p. 15) 
found that “[a]lthough several transit agencies have generated millions of dollars in annual 
revenue from joint development, this annual revenue is generally small when compared with an 
agency’s annual operating expenses.”  In fact, revenue from joint developments for the three 
North American transit agencies with the most experience in joint developments—Los Angeles 
Metro, Washington Metro, and Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit—amounted to at most one 
percent of their operating expenses in 2008 (GAO, 2010, pp. 15-16).  What could be the cause of 
this?  One possible reason is that transit agencies are not allowed by law to own commercial 
pieces of property.  Washington Metro officials noted that they do not have the authority to own 
land where condominiums are sold, and would rather opt to selling the land in that scenario 
(GAO, 2010, p. 17).  Another reason is that because of local resistance to increasing density, 
joint developments cannot be built to their full potential and, thus, generate less revenue.  
Finally, value capture was often discussed in the form of joint development, special assessment 
districts, tax increment financing, and development impact fees (GAO, 2010, pp. 5-8); with these 
methods, the added value of the land from accessibility to transit often goes to the local 
government, rather than the transit agency (GAO, 2010, p. 17).  Any amount that the transit 
agency does receive is only a portion of that originally generated, while the rest is used for other 
public infrastructure improvements (GAO, 2010, p. 17).  These conditions limit transit’s ability 
to benefit from value capture and reach its full potential in North America. 
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4.6. Land Use Implications in the U.S. 
 
It is often argued that the low population density of the U.S. relative to other developed countries 
is justification for not investing in transit.  The argument is indeed a valid one, and suggests the 
need for an institutional reform to change the status quo.  It should be understood that transit 
systems are by nature transmodal—a passenger using transit had to access the system using a 
different mode, such as walking, bicycling, or driving (Walker, 2012, p. 15).  Thus, the utility of 
transit systems depends on the size and quality of its catchment area, or “the area within which 
land use and urban design features and the ease and directness of access to the stop or station 
both have a substantial impact [on] transit ridership” (APTA, 2009, p. 3).  The general rule for 
the size of a catchment area of transit stops is the area within one-quarter of a mile in every 
direction from the transit stop, or a circle with a radius of one-fourth of a mile (APTA, 2009, p. 
3).  As the mobility of transit services offered by the transit stop or station increases, the radius 
of the catchment area tends to increase as well because a faster service provides larger travel 
time savings to passengers even if they had to walk a longer distance to reach the stop compared 
to just walking all the way to their destinations.  Hence, a regional transit stop or station will 
have a catchment area of up to three miles) (APTA, 2009, p. 3).  The catchment area can be a 
limitation to transit’s competitiveness compared to automobiles, which have instant mobility and 
near ubiquitous access.  However, the catchment area is also an advantage for transit systems 
because it provides an easy way to identify where transit operators can concentrate property 
developments and population density.  Suzuki, Cervero, and Iuchi (2013, p. 155) explain that 
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[w]hat matters most for transit and land-use integration is not average population 
densities but “articulated densities”—densities that are strategically distributed across 
parts of a metropolitan area.  The layout depicted in panel c of [Figure 19] is better suited 
for mass transit than the one in panel a, even though the two forms have the same average 
population density. 
 
 
Figure 19.  Articulated densities of urban developments.  (Suzuki, Cervero, and Iuchi, 2013, p. 155). 
 
Thus, extending the concept of articulated density along the entire length of a transit line that 
runs across a city, metropolitan area, or even between regions, it would be in the transit 
operator’s interests to plan and establish high density property developments on a “corridor” 
basis.  Figure 20 shows what the relative population density along a corridor might look like.  As 
Cervero (1998, pp. 189-190) and Chorus (2012, p. 350) write, planning for corridors would 
involve establishing a variety of intense land uses evenly at transit stops.  For example, on the 
ends of its Toyoko line (i.e., Shibuya Station in Tokyo and Sakuragicho in Yokohama), 
 
Tokyu anchored these two terminal stations with high-rise commercial centers (featuring 
Tokyu’s own department stores) and attracted several prominent university campuses to 
intermediate stations.  These commercial centers, along with the universities, have 
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produced a steady bidirectional flow of passengers, ensuring efficient train operations 
(Cervero, 1998, pp. 189-190). 
 
 
Figure 20.  Population density along a transit corridor.  Produced by the author. 
 
With the concept of station area corridor planning in mind, the transit operator would want to 
identify potential corridors that have room for the bus or railway right-of-way and station areas 
that have room for high-density mixed-use developments.  At the same time, however, in the 
U.S. it would be particularly important to choose places that people would expect to find density 
and intense land uses in order to avoid what may be perceived as an attack on the suburban 
lifestyle.  As Dimitriou explains, suburbia is directly influenced by a 
 
drive to preserve natural open space . . . . Natural open space is the sacred cow of the 
suburbs, and the design of suburban developments is intended to integrate buildings with 
a natural setting.  This stems from people’s desire to live in a big house with a bucolic 
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countryside and yet still have easy access to the leisure amenities and work opportunities 
in the city (2001, p. 18). 
 
As follows, the effort to fit denser station area developments within the existing urban and 
suburban fabric of metropolitan areas in the U.S. to support transit would have to be done 
without destroying the bucolic sense of suburbia or ruthlessly rebuilding the existing 
infrastructure and housing developments in the same way that highways did in the mid-20th 
Century (Norton, 2008, p. 241).  The effort would have to be done by 
 
pattern[ing] urban growth into a series of dense centers surrounding the traditional city 
center . . . . With this approach, we can reduce the dependence on the private automobile 
rather than force it’s (sic) elimination, and we can greatly improve the quality of place 
through mixing uses and defining public places (Dimitriou, 2001, p. 21). 
 
This idea comes straight from the Garden Cities concept proposed by Ebenezer Howard in 1902 
(Dimitriou, 2001, p. 21).  In the context of industrial London, the “Garden City” was designed to 
be a series of new towns located outside and away from the congestion and pollution of the city 
center.  The goal was to provide a “perfect union between the countryside and the town” 
(Dimitriou, 2001, p. 22). 
 
As such, Dimitriou identifies existing strip commercial centers in American metropolitan areas 
as ideal places to begin densifying suburbia (2001, p. 22).  This seems appropriate, since firstly, 
strip commercial centers are places where suburbanites would expect to experience the qualities 
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of high-density places, such as noise, pedestrian presence, commerce, and congestion (Dimitriou, 
2001, p. 23).  By increasing the density of strip commercial centers, one is not initiating a major 
shift in land use patterns that disturbs people’s identification with their current neighborhoods, 
but simply increasing the intensity of what already exists.  Secondly, strip commercial centers 
are generally auto-oriented, have large parking areas, and accommodate “shopping centers, 
office blocks, big box retail, and sometimes, medium-density housing” (Dimitriou, 2001, p. 13).  
In terms of urban design, these land uses have great potential to be reoriented as pedestrian 
public spaces as they provide the necessary space to do so.  Finally, strip commercial centers 
tend to be “located at the intersection of major arterials, and [are] most often composed of a 
string of commercially zoned lots that are each independently developed by private developers” 
(Dimitriou, 2001, p. 22).  As Walker notes, these thoroughfares, also called boulevards, are 
abundant in car-oriented cities and are perfect for providing the space and mobility that would 
allow transit to be accommodated quickly and offer competitive service within suburban areas 
(2012, p. 206). 
 
In response to the common claim that metropolitan areas in the U.S. are too low in population 
density or land-use intensity to justify providing transit services, a viable plan to densify 
suburban areas was provided.  The plan would encompass creating clusters of dense commercial 
and residential land uses within existing suburban areas on a “corridor” basis for transit lines.  
This involves 1) identifying arterials that provide the space and mobility necessary to support 
competitive transit service, 2) and identifying key locations, such as strip commercial centers, 
that can be redeveloped into denser TODs that provide the necessary ridership to justify transit 
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service.  The plan provides a basis for developing new institutional arrangements to proliferate 
the use of transit in U.S. metropolitan areas. 
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5. Conclusions and Findings 
 
While public transportation remains a small portion of total travel in the U.S., it is gaining 
ridership in real terms and provides an important relief of congestion and other positive 
externalities for urban areas.  The increase in ridership is a result of population growth, economic 
growth, higher gasoline prices, advertising of public transportation by transit agencies, and land 
use policies to encourage high-density TOD near transit stations.  Transit agencies have met this 
increase in ridership by providing more services and expanding their existing systems, but have 
also been financially strained by increased operations and capital expenditures.  Despite strong 
financial commitment in the form of operating subsidies and capital grants from all levels of 
government to support transit since 1998, the operating deficits have limited progress in 
increases of transit service and network expansions.  Thus, there was a need to find an 
institutional model that allows transit agencies to compete with other modes of transportation, 
including operating with positive operating margins and changing land use patterns to entice 
greater patronage. 
 
R + P, a system that has been in use by Japanese private railway companies and Hong Kong’s 
MTRC for decades, provides an institutionally different model from that of the U.S.  R + P, 
which involves transit operators to also assume the role of station area master planner, property 
developer, and property investor, allows transit operators to receive income other than farebox 
and increasingly constrained tax revenues.  Transit operators using R + P are able to realize 
positive operating margins while providing valuable transit service without straining 
governments of limited funds.  Because of the inherent features of R + P, transit operators are 
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able to efficiently manage the dynamic between transportation and land use on their systems, and 
are encouraged to maintain a “state of good repair” of their systems to retain ridership.  For 
patrons, this has resulted in a convenient and high-quality lifestyle that is both financially and 
environmentally sustainable.   
 
R + P differs from the U.S. model of transit operations and capital funding in several respects.  
The U.S. model emphasizes coordination between separate entities that carry out the roles of 
transit operations, master planning of station areas, property development, and property 
investment.  R + P integrates these roles into one entity and realizes lower transaction costs 
during the planning of these roles, resulting in a more holistically designed transportation system 
and TOD.  R + P is based on commercial principles, which transit agencies in the U.S. either are 
not authorized to conduct or do not have extensive experience with. 
 
R + P holds important lessons for transit agencies and policymakers in the U.S.  Efforts to 
expand services and transit networks can be benefitted greatly if R + P is adopted by U.S. transit 
agencies, and allow the American public to enjoy the many benefits of public transportation. 
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6. Recommendations 
 
Upon the findings of this paper, it is recommended in regard to policy that: 
 
Transit agencies in the U.S.: 
o Actively adopt a commercial and entrepreneurial approach to search for new 
ways to raise revenue to support transit operations and capital expenditures. 
o Establish an internal real-estate staff or office. 
o Establish an internal urban design staff or office to master plan station areas. 
o Coordinate with local and regional governments to develop corridor plans at 
the metropolitan scale. 
Policymakers at the local and regional level: 
o Allow transit agencies to engage in commercial activities and own 
commercial pieces of property. 
o Allow transit agencies to take the lead in master planning station areas. 
o Allow transit agencies to buy, develop, manage, and invest in property. 
o Allow transit agencies to engage in land readjustment, or parcel assembly, in 
coordination with landowners, local authorities, and property developers. 
o Establish a method to regulate ticket fares. 
o Coordinate with transit agencies to develop corridor plans at the metropolitan 
scale. 
Policymakers at the federal level: 
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o Provide guidance on how R + P, or elements thereof, can feasibly be adopted in 
the U.S. 
o Provide funding or other financial incentives for R + P pilot projects. 
 
For further research, it is recommended that property rights in the U.S., Hong Kong, and Japan 
be studied and compared to identify any potential impediments to R + P in the U.S.  In particular, 
the issue of condemnation of private property for an R + P project should be discussed to explore 
the constitutionality of such an action.  What should also be studied is the Railway Accounting 
Ordinance (Tetsudo kaikei kisoku) which limits cross-subsidization between railway, property 
development, and other operations of Japanese private railway companies.  It seems that such a 
regulation prevents the basic advantage of R + P, which allows transit operators to have their 
transit operations financially supported by services that benefit from transit.  A discussion in the 
Japanese context of this issue was brief and inconclusive, and there was no mention by the 
literature of a similar law in Hong Kong, suggesting that MTRC can engage in cross-
subsidization of operations.  Fare regulation is another topic that should be investigated.  
Privatization brings up the concern of whether a private entity can adequately provide the public 
service of transportation affordably and equitably to all segments of the population in a manner 
comparable to that of a public provider.  In Japan, fare prices are stringently regulated by MLIT, 
and any increase in fares must be justified.  The resulting fare price must fall within an 
acceptable range of fare prices of other comparable transit providers.  In Hong Kong, although 
there was no discussion of regulation of fare prices, since the central government owns over 
three-fourths of MTRC, it is assumed that fare prices are set to be affordable to most of the 
population.  A discussion of what concessionary relationships may be possible with R + P would 
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also be helpful.  While this paper took the approach that existing transit agencies could engage in 
new operations to increase revenue and patronage (i.e., master planning, property development 
and property management), another approach would be for transit agencies to act as an asset 
holder of the transit infrastructure and invite companies to operate trains and engage in station 
area development in exchange for a portion of future revenues.  For land use in the U.S., the 
viability of introducing R + P on a metropolitan scale should be looked into.  If multiple transit 
operators become engaged in R + P within the same metropolitan area, rules for fair play and 
cooperation should be adopted as early as possible to institute them into the behavior of the 
operators with as little conflict as possible. 
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